RHEL 10 Security Enhancements: What Changed
Red Hat-documented RHEL 10 security changes: post-quantum crypto by release, SHA-1 removal, install-time FIPS, SELinux, OpenSCAP, Keylime and image mode.
RHEL 10 changes security in five main areas: post-quantum cryptography in the system crypto policies, TLS, OpenSSH and package signing; stricter defaults that remove SHA-1 and RSA key exchange; an updated SELinux, OpenSCAP and Keylime stack; FIPS mode that must be set at install time; and image mode for sealed, signed operating system images.
This article lists what Red Hat documents for RHEL 10 and its minor releases 10.0, 10.1 and 10.2, and what each change means for administrators. All claims come from Red Hat documentation, Red Hat blogs and Red Hat product pages. Hands-on hardening steps are in our RHEL 10 hardening guide, and the overall setup is in the beginner's guide to setting up RHEL 10.
Key takeaways
- RHEL 10.0 shipped post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a Technology Preview. RHEL 10.1 made it generally available and enabled it in the DEFAULT crypto policy. RHEL 10.2 enabled post-quantum SSH key exchange by default.
- SHA-1 signatures are no longer allowed in TLS under LEGACY, the SHA1 subpolicy is gone, and DEFAULT rejects TLS ciphers that use RSA key exchange.
- FIPS mode must be enabled at installation. Switching an installed RHEL 10 system to FIPS mode is not supported, and
fips-mode-setupis removed. - SELinux user-space is version 3.8 in RHEL 10, and Keylime and OpenSCAP are updated (Keylime agent 0.2.5 at 10.0, OpenSCAP 1.4.x).
- Image mode adds a Technology Preview for cryptographic sealing of bootc images, and base images include an SBOM.
- Red Hat says PQC will not be backported to RHEL 9 or earlier, so older systems stay on classical algorithms.
Summary by area
| Area | What changed in RHEL 10 | Where you notice it |
|---|---|---|
| Cryptography | PQC key exchange and signatures; SHA-1 and RSA key exchange removed from defaults | TLS, SSH, package signing, old clients that fail to connect |
| FIPS | New FIPS cryptographic module; install-time enablement only | Build process for regulated systems |
| Mandatory access control | SELinux 3.8 user space; new module for fapolicyd in 10.2 | Policy tools and denials |
| Compliance | OpenSCAP 1.4.x scanning and remediation | Audit and baseline checks |
| Attestation | Keylime updates, keylime-policy tool | Integrity monitoring of fleets |
| Supply chain | Signed packages, SBOMs, sealed bootc images (Technology Preview) | Image builds and verification |
Post-quantum cryptography, release by release
Some attackers record encrypted traffic today in the hope of decrypting it once quantum computers exist. This is called "harvest now, decrypt later", and Red Hat names it as the reason to upgrade to the latest RHEL 10 release. PQC algorithms are designed to resist such attacks. Red Hat's rollout in RHEL 10 has three stages:
| Release | Post-quantum changes |
|---|---|
| 10.0 | PQC arrived in OpenSSL, GnuTLS and NSS, and in OpenSSH, as a Technology Preview. Post-quantum key exchange was available for TLS 1.3. OpenSSH 9.9 offered two hybrid key exchange methods: sntrup761x25519-sha512 and mlkem768x25519-sha256 |
| 10.1 | ML-KEM key exchange in TLS became generally available in Go, OpenSSL, GnuTLS and NSS. ML-DSA certificates are supported in OpenSSL, GnuTLS and NSS. The DEFAULT crypto policy enables and prefers PQC. mlkem768x25519-sha256 became OpenSSH's preferred method |
| 10.2 | Post-quantum SSH key exchange is enabled by default, including in FIPS mode and in libssh-based applications. Two FIPS-compatible methods were added: mlkem768nistp256-sha256 and mlkem1024nistp384-sha384. PKI gained support for issuing post-quantum certificates |
Practical points from the Red Hat sources:
- "Hybrid" means a classical algorithm and a post-quantum algorithm run together, so a flaw in one does not break the exchange.
- Public certificate authorities do not yet offer PQC certificates, according to Red Hat's RHEL 10.1 post. Private CAs and self-signed certificates can use them.
- Red Hat's package signing now includes a hybrid post-quantum key (ML-DSA-87 with Ed448) alongside RSA. Systems that understand the newer RPM 6 header format and OpenPGP v6 signatures verify both, and older systems check only the RSA signature.
- Red Hat documents a known issue: systems with PQ algorithms disabled cannot install packages signed with both classical and post-quantum cryptography.
- Red Hat also warns that future releases might restrict the FUTURE policy to post-quantum signature algorithms only.
Check which policy is active:
update-crypto-policies --show
To opt out of PQC, Red Hat says to apply the NO-PQ subpolicy to the chosen policy, for example sudo update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:NO-PQ. Do this only if you have a specific interoperability problem, because it removes the protection against recorded traffic.
Stricter cryptographic defaults
RHEL 10 continues the trend of dropping weak algorithms from the system-wide crypto policies. Red Hat's adoption guide lists these changes:
- The SHA1 subpolicy, which let the DEFAULT policy accept SHA-1 signatures, is no longer available.
- Under LEGACY, SHA-1 signatures can no longer be created or verified in TLS. Re-enabling them requires LEGACY plus a custom cipher string with
@SECLEVEL=0, which is a deliberate step backwards in security. - DEFAULT now rejects TLS ciphers that use RSA key exchange, since they lack forward secrecy.
- DSA was removed from NSS, and Red Hat recommends RSA or ECDSA instead.
- HMAC-SHA-1 is deprecated in FIPS mode and might be removed later.
- SSH host key file permissions were tightened from 0640 to 0600.
The visible effect is that very old clients, appliances and internal tools that only speak legacy algorithms may fail to connect after migration. Test them before cut-over, and prefer upgrading the client over weakening the server policy. The SSH keys and security guide for RHEL 10 covers key types and server settings.
FIPS mode changes
Red Hat's RHEL 10 pages state that RHEL 10 includes a new FIPS cryptographic module, and that security fixes can be applied without a new validation certificate. The operational change is larger:
- FIPS mode must be enabled during installation. Switching an installed system to FIPS mode is not supported in RHEL 10.
- The
fips-mode-setupcommand is removed. Enabling relies on thefips=1kernel argument at install time, and the/etc/system-fipsfile is gone. - FIPS mode is not available in WSL instances of RHEL.
For regulated environments, add FIPS to the installation checklist (kickstart or image build) instead of treating it as a post-install task. The difference between "FIPS mode enabled" and "validated module" matters in audits, so check which certification your auditor expects.
SELinux, auditing and application control
RHEL 10 ships SELinux user-space components at version 3.8, and the 10.2 release notes list a rebase of the setools packages to upstream 4.6.0. Red Hat also added a new SELinux module in 10.2 to protect the fapolicyd service, and moved some SELinux domains from permissive to enforcing mode. Take two lessons from this:
- Keep SELinux enforcing and fix denials with proper contexts or booleans instead of disabling it. See SELinux in RHEL 10 explained.
- Combine SELinux with application allow-listing (
fapolicyd) and auditing. Our auditd guide shows how to log security-relevant events.
Check the state with getenforce and sestatus. Red Hat's 10.0 notes record one limitation: in one virtualization context it is not possible to set SELinux to enforcing mode, so read the known issues before deploying there.
Compliance scanning with OpenSCAP
RHEL 10 provides OpenSCAP 1.4.x, which can scan configurations against security profiles and can also remediate automatically. A typical flow is to install the scanner and the SCAP Security Guide content, list the profiles, run a scan with an HTML report, and review failures before remediating anything:
sudo dnf install openscap-scanner scap-security-guide
oscap info /usr/share/xml/scap/ssg/content/ssg-rhel10-ds.xml
Run scans in a test environment first. Automatic remediation changes system settings, and a profile written for strict compliance can disable features your applications use. The red lines of your baseline should come from your own risk assessment.
Integrity monitoring with Keylime
Keylime verifies the integrity of remote systems using a TPM. According to the Red Hat release notes, RHEL 10 provides the Keylime agent at version 0.2.5 with support for Initial Device Identity (IDevID) and Initial Attestation Key (IAK). In 10.2 the agent rebases to 0.2.9 and adds a new agent-driven push attestation model. The keylime-policy tool replaces several older policy scripts, and Keylime components no longer support HTTP for revocation notification webhooks, so use HTTPS endpoints. Teams using Keylime should check their webhook configuration before upgrading.
Image mode and the software supply chain
Red Hat's RHEL security page describes image mode as supporting pre-hardening and finding defects earlier in the pipeline, and lists signed packages, SBOMs and VEX data as supply chain tools. The image mode documentation adds details for RHEL 10:
- Cryptographic sealing of bootc images is a Technology Preview. The build hashes the root file system and embeds the digest in a Secure Boot-signed Unified Kernel Image, so the system boots only if the file system matches what was built.
- Sealed images need ext4 or btrfs, because XFS does not support fs-verity. Per-file fs-verity checks block tampered reads at runtime.
- Base images ship with a software bill of materials (SBOM).
- Hardening profiles can be applied across package mode and image mode.
Technology Preview features are not covered by production support in the same way as fully supported ones, so check Red Hat's support scope before relying on sealing in production.
Other platform security features Red Hat lists
- Red Hat Lightspeed (formerly Red Hat Insights) detects, prioritizes and helps remediate CVEs and monitors deviations from policy.
- Confidential computing uses trusted execution environments and confidential VMs, with remote attestation. The sources reviewed here describe the goal but give little detail on configuration, so treat it as an area to read the product documentation for.
- RHEL System Roles automate security configuration, and OpenSCAP monitors compliance.
Migration checklist
- Decide on FIPS before installation and put
fips=1into your build process if required. - Inventory clients and services that use SHA-1, RSA key exchange or DSA, and upgrade them. Test TLS and SSH from every important client.
- Run
update-crypto-policies --showon each system and record exceptions with an owner and an expiry date. - Keep SELinux enforcing. Review denials rather than switching to permissive.
- Scan a baseline image with OpenSCAP and keep the report.
- If you use Keylime, move webhooks to HTTPS and learn
keylime-policy. - Decide which RHEL 10 minor release to standardize on, and plan updates, since PQC defaults differ between 10.0, 10.1 and 10.2. The lifecycle details are in our RHEL 10 support lifecycle article.
Learn it hands-on
Security tasks such as SELinux, firewalld, SSH and users are part of the Red Hat certification objectives. Our RHCSA training in Pune (classroom in Kharadi and live online) practises them in labs, and the firewalld command guide for RHEL 10 is a good first lab.
Frequently asked questions
What are the main security enhancements in RHEL 10?
Post-quantum cryptography across TLS, SSH and package signing, stricter default crypto policies (no SHA-1 in TLS, no RSA key exchange in DEFAULT), updated SELinux, OpenSCAP and Keylime components, install-time FIPS mode, and image mode features such as SBOMs and sealed bootc images.
Is post-quantum cryptography enabled by default in RHEL 10?
It depends on the minor release. It was a Technology Preview in 10.0. RHEL 10.1 enables PQC in the DEFAULT crypto policy, and RHEL 10.2 enables post-quantum SSH key exchange by default.
Can I disable post-quantum algorithms?
Red Hat documents the NO-PQ subpolicy for that purpose. Apply it to your chosen policy only when necessary, and note the known issue with installing packages signed with both classical and post-quantum signatures.
Can I enable FIPS mode on an existing RHEL 10 server?
No. Red Hat states that FIPS mode must be enabled during installation, and switching after installation is not supported. The fips-mode-setup command was removed.
Why do old clients fail to connect to a RHEL 10 server?
The DEFAULT policy no longer accepts SHA-1 signatures in TLS or TLS ciphers that use RSA key exchange, and DSA was removed from NSS. Upgrade the client, or use a documented policy exception for a limited time.
Does RHEL 10 still use SELinux?
Yes, and Red Hat promotes it as a core control. RHEL 10 includes SELinux user-space version 3.8, and release 10.2 adds a module protecting fapolicyd. Keep it in enforcing mode.
Will RHEL 9 get the post-quantum features?
Red Hat says PQC functions should not be expected to be backported to RHEL 9 or earlier. Its RHEL 10.1 post mentions that RHEL 9.7 can enable PQC in TLS for OpenSSL and NSS applications using the DEFAULT:PQ policy setting.
What is Keylime used for?
Remote attestation: it uses a TPM to check that a machine booted known software and has not been altered. RHEL 10 provides the agent and a new keylime-policy tool.
Official references
- Considerations in adopting RHEL 10: Security (Red Hat documentation)
- RHEL 10.0 release notes: new features and enhancements
- RHEL 10.2 release notes: new features and enhancements
- RHEL 10 security hardening: system-wide cryptographic policies
- What's new in post-quantum cryptography in RHEL 10.1 (Red Hat blog)
- Advancing post-quantum capabilities of SSH in RHEL (Red Hat blog)
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux security (Red Hat)
- Cryptographic sealing of bootc images (Red Hat documentation)
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